The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) stands as the principal intergovernmental organization for regional cooperation in South Asia, encompassing eight member states: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Established in 1985 with the core objectives of promoting economic growth, social progress, and cultural development within the region, SAARC aimed to foster collective self-reliance and contribute to mutual trust and understanding among its diverse member nations. As the largest country in terms of geographical area, population, and economic size, India‘s role within SAARC has been undeniably central, multifaceted, and often contradictory, shaping the organization’s trajectory significantly.
India‘s prominent position in SAARC is a direct consequence of its sheer scale and influence, which inevitably casts it as both a potential engine for regional prosperity and a perceived hegemon by its smaller neighbours. Its economic prowess, strategic location, and cultural ties with almost all SAARC members place it at the heart of any regional integration effort. Consequently, evaluating India’s role in SAARC necessitates a nuanced examination of its contributions to the organization’s successes, the challenges it has faced, and the criticisms it has garnered, particularly concerning the power asymmetries and the pervasive impact of bilateral disputes on multilateral cooperation.
India’s Role in SAARC: A Multifaceted Engagement
India, as a founding member, was instrumental in the conceptualization and establishment of SAARC. The idea of regional cooperation in South Asia had been debated for decades, with India often at the forefront, advocating for a platform to address common developmental challenges and promote shared prosperity. India’s vision for SAARC was one of a vibrant economic bloc that could leverage the region’s vast human and natural resources, foster greater trade, and collectively address issues like poverty, illiteracy, and environmental degradation. This initial impetus showcased India’s commitment to multilateralism and its recognition of the interconnectedness of South Asian destinies.
Economically, India’s role has been pivotal due to its status as the largest economy in the region, accounting for over 80% of SAARC’s collective GDP. This economic might translates into significant trade potential, investment flows, and market access for smaller member states. India has been a strong proponent of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which came into force in 2006, aiming to reduce tariffs and promote intra-regional trade. While SAFTA’s implementation has been slow and its impact limited by non-tariff barriers and political hurdles, India has often taken unilateral steps to open its markets to goods from least developed countries (LDCs) within SAARC, such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan, by offering duty-free access for a wide range of products. Furthermore, India has been a significant source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into SAARC countries, particularly in sectors like energy, infrastructure, and services, contributing to job creation and economic growth in its neighbours.
Beyond trade and investment, India has also been a major provider of developmental assistance and capacity building initiatives within the SAARC framework. Through bilateral aid programs, lines of credit, and technical cooperation schemes, India has supported numerous projects in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and agriculture across the region. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program, for instance, has provided training and scholarships to thousands of professionals from SAARC countries in diverse fields, enhancing human resource development and fostering goodwill. India’s commitment to shared prosperity is also evident in its efforts to promote regional connectivity. Initiatives such as the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicles Agreement, while a sub-regional effort, aligns with the broader SAARC objective of improving physical connectivity through roads, railways, and waterways. India has also invested in cross-border energy grids, connecting its power network with those of Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, contributing to regional energy security and promoting the export of hydropower from these countries.
In the realm of disaster management and humanitarian assistance, India has often assumed a leading role, leveraging its extensive experience and capabilities in responding to natural calamities. Whether it is earthquake relief in Nepal, cyclone rehabilitation in Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, or water crisis assistance in Maldives, India has frequently been among the first responders, providing essential supplies, medical teams, and rescue operations. This aspect of India’s role underscores its commitment to regional solidarity and collective action in times of crisis, demonstrating its willingness to use its resources for the welfare of its neighbours, often in coordination with SAARC’s disaster management mechanisms.
India has also championed various people-to-people connectivity initiatives, recognizing that strong ties among citizens are fundamental to deeper regional integration. This includes promoting tourism, facilitating cultural exchanges, and easing visa regimes for SAARC citizens, though progress on these fronts has often been hampered by security concerns and bilateral tensions, particularly with Pakistan. Culturally, India shares deep historical, linguistic, and religious ties with many SAARC members, which it has sought to leverage for mutual understanding and cooperation through cultural festivals, academic exchanges, and media cooperation.
Despite these significant contributions, India’s role in SAARC has been marked by substantial challenges and criticisms. The most prominent issue stems from the inherent asymmetrical power dynamics within the region. India’s overwhelming size and economic might often lead smaller neighbours to perceive it as a “big brother” or even a hegemonic power, rather than an equal partner. This perception, whether real or imagined, can breed mistrust and a reluctance among smaller states to fully commit to initiatives that might be seen as disproportionately benefiting India or undermining their sovereignty. This “big brother” syndrome can manifest in various ways, from anxieties over economic dominance to concerns about India’s security interests overlapping with or influencing their domestic affairs.
The persistent and often acrimonious bilateral disputes, particularly between India and Pakistan, have undoubtedly been the most significant impediment to SAARC’s progress. The unresolved Kashmir issue, cross-border terrorism, and historical mistrust have repeatedly derailed SAARC summits and initiatives. The organization’s charter requires consensus for all major decisions, effectively granting any member state a veto. Pakistan’s reservations, often driven by its security concerns and historical grievances with India, have frequently stalled collective action, leading to a state of near paralysis for SAARC, especially in recent years. The last SAARC Summit was held in Kathmandu in 2014, and subsequent attempts to convene have been thwarted due to Indo-Pak tensions, notably following the Uri attack in 2016, after which India effectively boycotted the Islamabad summit.
Critics also point to India’s inconsistent engagement with SAARC. While rhetorically committed to regionalism, India has often shifted its focus towards bilateral relations when SAARC collective action falters. Moreover, India has increasingly prioritized sub-regional groupings like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the BBIN initiative. These platforms, crucially, do not include Pakistan, allowing India to pursue regional cooperation unhindered by the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. This shift, while pragmatic for India, raises questions about its long-term commitment to SAARC as the primary vehicle for South Asian integration and potentially diminishes the relevance of the organization.
Furthermore, India has been criticized for not fully leveraging its economic potential to foster deeper integration. Despite advocating for SAFTA, non-tariff barriers, protective policies for certain domestic industries, and a complex regulatory environment have often hindered the flow of goods and services from smaller SAARC nations into the vast Indian market. This contributes to significant trade imbalances, with smaller nations often running large deficits with India, fueling resentment and calls for a more equitable trading relationship. Concerns about market access, standards, and dispute resolution mechanisms within SAARC have also been persistent.
From a security perspective, India’s counter-terrorism agenda, while vital for its national security, has sometimes overshadowed other SAARC objectives. India has consistently pushed for stronger regional cooperation on counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and combating cross-border financing of terror groups. While these are legitimate concerns, the lack of consensus, particularly with Pakistan, on defining terrorism and addressing its root causes has often led to diplomatic stalemates, consuming valuable SAARC meeting time without yielding concrete results.
Looking ahead, India’s strategic considerations in the region are evolving. The growing influence of China, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh, presents both a challenge and an opportunity for India. While India views some aspects of BRI with suspicion, particularly its implications for sovereignty and debt sustainability, it also recognizes the need to offer compelling alternatives and accelerate its own connectivity and development projects in the neighborhood. This geopolitical competition underscores the importance for India to be an effective partner and a reliable provider of public goods in South Asia, whether through SAARC or alternative mechanisms.
India’s primary objective within SAARC was to foster a stable, prosperous, and interconnected South Asia. However, the organization’s inherent structural weaknesses, compounded by the deep-seated political rivalries and asymmetrical power dynamics, have severely hampered its ability to fulfill this vision. India’s leadership, while often well-intentioned and resource-rich, has at times been perceived as overbearing or inconsistent, leading to a trust deficit among some member states. The persistent Indo-Pakistan antagonism remains the single most significant roadblock, rendering SAARC largely ineffective as a multilateral forum.
Consequently, while India remains a theoretical champion of regionalism in South Asia, its practical engagement has increasingly shifted towards sub-regional groupings like BIMSTEC, BBIN, and bilateral partnerships. These alternative platforms offer India the flexibility to pursue its strategic and economic interests without the constraints imposed by the SAARC consensus mechanism, particularly given Pakistan’s often obstructionist stance. While SAARC’s future remains uncertain, India’s active participation in other regional fora underscores its commitment to regional cooperation, albeit through more pragmatic and viable channels that bypass the enduring geopolitical challenges within the traditional SAARC framework.