The Governor holds a pivotal and unique position within the constitutional framework of India, serving as the titular head of a state, much like the President at the Union level. This office embodies the federal structure of the Indian polity, acting as a crucial link between the Union government and the state administration. Appointed by the President of India, the Governor is not directly elected by the people, which immediately distinguishes the role from the elected Chief Minister and the state legislature. This non-elected nature imbues the office with a distinct character, primarily intended to ensure constitutional propriety and the smooth functioning of parliamentary democracy within the state, while also safeguarding the unity and integrity of the nation.

The dual nature of the Governor’s role is perhaps its most defining characteristic and a constant source of academic and political debate. On one hand, the Governor is the constitutional head of the state, bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers led by the Chief Minister, similar to the President’s relationship with the Union Cabinet. On the other hand, the Governor acts as a representative of the Union government, obligated to ensure that the state administration functions in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. This dual responsibility necessitates a delicate balance, requiring the Governor to uphold both state autonomy and national unity. The exercise of certain discretionary powers, not typically available to a purely ceremonial head, further complicates this balance and has historically led to friction between the Centre and states, particularly when different political parties are in power at these two levels.

Constitutional Basis and Appointment

The office of the Governor is enshrined in Part VI of the Indian Constitution, specifically under Articles 153 to 167. Article 153 states that there shall be a Governor for each state, although the same person can be appointed as Governor for two or more states (as per the 7th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1956). Article 154 vests the executive power of the state in the Governor, to be exercised either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution.

The appointment process is detailed in Article 155, which stipulates that the Governor of a state shall be appointed by the President of India by warrant under his hand and seal. This means the Governor is effectively appointed by the Union government on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Union Council of Ministers. There is a convention, though not legally binding, that the Chief Minister of the concerned state is consulted before the appointment of a Governor. However, this convention has often been disregarded, leading to accusations of the Centre imposing its choices on states. The Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President of India (Article 156), which implies that there is no fixed tenure and the Governor can be removed by the President at any time. This “pleasure doctrine” has been a significant point of contention, as it gives the Union government immense leverage over the Governor, potentially compromising the latter’s impartiality. While the Indian Constitution does not lay down specific grounds for removal, the Supreme Court has clarified that the removal must not be arbitrary or whimsical. Qualifications for appointment (Article 157) include being a citizen of India and having completed the age of 35 years. Additionally, the Governor cannot be a member of Parliament or a state legislature (Article 158).

Executive Powers and Functions

As the constitutional head of the state executive, the Governor performs a wide array of executive functions. All executive actions of the state government are formally taken in the Governor’s name. Article 164 empowers the Governor to appoint the Chief Minister and, on the Chief Minister’s advice, other members of the Council of Ministers. The Governor also appoints the Advocate General of the state, who holds office during the pleasure of the Governor. The Chairman and members of the State Public Service Commission are appointed by the Governor, though they can only be removed by the President. Similarly, the State Election Commissioner is appointed by the Governor. The Governor also has the power to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the state government and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business. The Governor can seek any information relating to the administration of the affairs of the state and proposals for legislation from the Chief Minister. In states with tribal areas, the Governor has special responsibilities concerning the administration of such areas, particularly under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution.

Legislative Powers and Functions

The Governor is an integral part of the state legislature, even though not a member of either House. The legislative powers of the Governor are extensive and play a critical role in the legislative process of the state. Under Article 174, the Governor has the power to summon and prorogue the sessions of the state legislature and to dissolve the legislative assembly. The Governor addresses the first session of the legislature after each general election and the first session of each year (Article 176), outlining the government’s policy and legislative agenda. The Governor can send messages to the House or Houses of the legislature (Article 175) regarding a bill pending in the legislature or otherwise.

A crucial legislative power lies in the assent to bills (Article 200). A bill passed by the state legislature becomes law only after receiving the Governor’s assent. The Governor has four options regarding a bill:

  1. Give assent: The bill becomes an act.
  2. Withhold assent: The bill does not become an act.
  3. Return the bill for reconsideration: Applicable only to non-money bills, with a request for the legislature to reconsider the bill or any specified provisions, or to consider any amendments. If the bill is passed again by the legislature, with or without amendments, the Governor must give assent.
  4. Reserve the bill for the consideration of the President: This is a significant discretionary power. The Governor must reserve a bill if it would “derogate from the powers of the High Court” or if it is ultra vires the Constitution. The Governor may also reserve a bill if it is against the provisions of the Constitution, opposes the Directive Principles of State Policy, is against the larger interest of the country, or is of grave national importance, or deals with compulsory acquisition of property. Once reserved, the bill’s fate rests with the President, who may give assent, withhold assent, or direct the Governor to return it to the state legislature for reconsideration (Article 201). If the President directs reconsideration, and the state legislature passes the bill again, the President is not bound to give assent, unlike the Governor in case of reconsideration by the state legislature. This provides a mechanism for the Centre to control state legislation.

Furthermore, the Governor possesses the power to promulgate ordinances (Article 213) when the state legislature, or either house where there are two houses, is not in session. Such ordinances have the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature, but they must be laid before the legislature when it reassembles and cease to operate six weeks from the reassembly, unless approved earlier. This power is to be exercised only when the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, and it is also subject to the Governor reserving the ordinance for the President’s consideration in certain cases.

Financial Powers

The Governor also holds certain financial powers. No money bill can be introduced in the state legislative assembly except on the recommendation of the Governor (Article 207). The Governor ensures that the Annual Financial Statement, i.e., the state budget, is laid before the state legislature (Article 202). The Governor has the power to make advances out of the Contingency Fund of the State to meet unforeseen expenditure pending authorisation by the legislature. Audit reports of the state government are caused to be laid before the legislature by the Governor.

Judicial Powers

Under Article 161, the Governor has the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the state extends. However, this power is not as extensive as that of the President; the Governor cannot pardon a death sentence (though can commute or suspend it) and cannot pardon in cases of court-martial. The Governor is consulted by the President during the appointment of judges of the High Court. Moreover, the Governor makes appointments, postings, and promotions of district judges in consultation with the State High Court and appoints other judicial officers below the rank of district judges in consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.

Discretionary Powers and Role as an Agent of the Centre

The exercise of discretionary powers is where the Governor’s role becomes most contentious and distinct from that of a mere constitutional head. While the vast majority of the Governor’s functions are exercised on the “aid and advice” of the Council of Ministers, the Constitution specifically grants certain areas where the Governor can act in his or her “discretion” (Article 163). These include:

  • Appointment of the Chief Minister: When no single party secures a clear majority in the state assembly elections, the Governor has the discretion to invite the leader of a party or a coalition to form the government. This has often led to controversies, with Governors being accused of favouring certain political parties.
  • Dismissal of the Ministry: If the Council of Ministers loses the confidence of the legislative assembly but refuses to resign, the Governor can dismiss it. However, this power is subject to the condition that the loss of confidence must be demonstrably clear, usually through a floor test.
  • Dissolution of the Legislative Assembly: When a no-confidence motion against the government is passed, and no other stable government can be formed, the Governor can dissolve the assembly, paving the way for fresh elections. This power is also used when the Council of Ministers advises dissolution, but the Governor may reject such advice if it seems mala fide or against public interest.
  • Reservation of a Bill for the President’s consideration (Article 200): As discussed, this is a significant power allowing the Governor to refer state legislation to the President, effectively subjecting state laws to Union scrutiny.
  • Recommendation for the imposition of President’s Rule (Article 356): If the Governor is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Constitution, he or she can report this to the President. This recommendation is often the precursor to the imposition of President’s Rule, leading to the suspension of the state government and the assumption of state powers by the Union. This power has been widely criticised for its frequent misuse for political purposes.
  • Seeking information from the Chief Minister regarding legislative proposals and administrative decisions (Article 167(b)).
  • Special responsibilities: In certain states (like Maharashtra, Gujarat, Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Goa, Karnataka), the Governor has special responsibilities concerning the administration of tribal areas, development boards, or law and order, where the Governor can act independently of the Council of Ministers.

The role of the Governor as an “agent of the Centre” is largely derived from the power to recommend President’s Rule and to reserve bills for the President’s consideration. Critics argue that this aspect of the role undermines the federal principle and state autonomy. Governors have often been perceived as acting at the behest of the Union government, especially when a different political party is in power at the Centre and in the state. This has led to accusations of partisanship, hindering the functioning of elected state governments, and even attempts to destabilise them.

Controversies and Judicial Interventions

The history of the Governor’s office in India is replete with controversies, predominantly stemming from the exercise of discretionary powers. Instances of Governors:

  • Dismissing elected state governments summarily without allowing a floor test.
  • Inviting minority parties or post-election coalitions to form governments, bypassing the single largest party.
  • Delaying or withholding assent to bills passed by the state legislature, or reserving them for presidential consideration without strong constitutional grounds.
  • Unwarranted recommendations for President’s Rule.
  • Manipulating the summoning or proroguing of the assembly sessions to favour a particular political outcome.

These actions have led to significant legal challenges and judicial pronouncements aimed at clarifying the scope of gubernatorial discretion. The landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) judgment by the Supreme Court significantly curtailed the arbitrary use of Article 356. The Court ruled that the imposition of President’s Rule is subject to judicial review, and the majority of the government must be tested on the floor of the House, not in the Governor’s opinion. This judgment established that the Governor’s report under Article 356 must be based on objective facts and not on subjective satisfaction.

Other judicial pronouncements have also reiterated that the Governor is not an ombudsman of the state government and generally must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in truly exceptional circumstances where specific discretionary powers are outlined or implied.

Recommendations for Reform

Given the persistent controversies surrounding the Governor’s role, various commissions and committees have recommended reforms to ensure the impartiality and dignity of the office:

  • Sarkaria Commission (1988): Recommended that the Chief Minister of the concerned state should be consulted before the appointment of the Governor. It also suggested that the Governor should be a distinguished person from outside the state and not be actively involved in politics for a long time. For the removal of the Governor, it suggested a procedure similar to that for the removal of a Supreme Court judge. It emphasised that Article 356 should be used sparingly, only as a last resort, and that the Governor’s report must contain all relevant facts and grounds.
  • National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC, 2000-02): Reaffirmed many of the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations. It suggested that a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the Chief Minister of the concerned state should select the Governor. It also advocated for greater transparency in the process of appointment and removal.
  • M.M. Punchhi Commission (2010): Further explored the issues. It recommended that the “pleasure of the President” for the Governor’s removal should be restricted, and that a clear procedure for removal, including an impeachment-like process, should be established. It suggested that the Governor should have a fixed five-year term. The Commission also proposed that the Governor should not be given a role in active politics after demitting office. Regarding Article 356, it recommended that guidelines for its use should be clearly laid down and observed, and local emergency provisions (Articles 355 and 356) be amended to allow for localised interventions rather than wholesale dissolution of the state government.

These recommendations largely aim to ensure that the Governor acts as a truly neutral constitutional functionary, rather than a political appointee or an agent of the central government.

The Governor’s role in Indian politics is undeniably complex and multifaceted, oscillating between that of a symbolic constitutional head and a functional representative of the Union government. The office is designed to uphold the Constitution, ensure the stability of state governments, and act as a crucial link within India’s federal structure. The powers vested in the Governor, particularly the discretionary ones, are significant and intended to serve as checks and balances, safeguarding against constitutional breakdowns in the states.

Despite its vital constitutional mandate, the Governor’s office has frequently been embroiled in controversies, largely due to the perception and reality of political partisanship in appointments and the exercise of powers. The “pleasure doctrine” concerning tenure and the broad discretionary powers, especially concerning the appointment of Chief Ministers, dissolution of assemblies, and the recommendation of President’s Rule, have often led to accusations of the Governor acting as an instrument of the ruling party at the Centre, thus undermining state autonomy and the spirit of cooperative federalism.

The numerous judicial pronouncements, particularly the landmark S.R. Bommai case, have sought to define and limit the scope of gubernatorial discretion, reinforcing the principle that the Governor must generally act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and that a government’s majority must be tested on the floor of the House. However, the political dynamics often continue to test these constitutional conventions and judicial directives. For the Governor’s office to fully realise its constitutional potential and maintain its dignity and impartiality, adherence to established conventions, transparent appointment and removal processes, and a clear code of conduct for the exercise of discretionary powers are imperative. This would strengthen both federalism and parliamentary democracy in India.