India, a nation characterized by its vast diversity and complex socio-political landscape, adopted a federal system of governance upon attaining independence. However, the operational dynamics of this federal structure, particularly the intricate balance between the Union (Centre) and the States, have been a subject of continuous debate and evolution. Over the decades following independence, as the political landscape matured and regional aspirations gained prominence, tensions periodically arose regarding the distribution of powers, responsibilities, and financial resources between the Centre and the constituent states. These tensions often manifested as demands for greater state autonomy and a re-evaluation of the constitutional provisions governing Centre-State relations.

In response to these persistent concerns and the growing need for a comprehensive review of the existing arrangements, the Government of India constituted the Sarkaria Commission in 1983. Chaired by Justice R.S. Sarkaria, a retired judge of the Supreme Court of India, the commission was tasked with examining the working of the arrangements between the Union and the States and recommending appropriate changes and measures. Its primary objective was to ensure a smooth and harmonious relationship within the federal framework, promoting national unity while respecting the diversity and autonomy of the states. The commission’s report, submitted in 1988, became a landmark document, offering invaluable insights and recommendations that continue to influence the discourse on Indian federalism.

Background and Mandate of the Sarkaria Commission

The Sarkaria Commission was established by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, on June 9, 1983. Its full name was the “Commission on Centre-State Relations.” Justice R.S. Sarkaria served as its chairman, and its other members were Shri B. Sivaraman (former Cabinet Secretary) and Dr. S.R. Sen (former Executive Director of the World Bank). The commission’s terms of reference were broad and comprehensive: “to examine and review the working of the existing arrangements between the Union and States in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities in all spheres and recommend such changes or other measures as may be appropriate.” This mandate effectively covered legislative, administrative, financial, and other miscellaneous aspects of Centre-State relations, making it the most extensive official inquiry into India’s federal system to date. The commission conducted extensive research, solicited opinions from various stakeholders including state governments, political parties, academics, and the public, and produced a report spanning 19 chapters and over 1600 pages, containing 247 recommendations.

Salient Features and Key Recommendations

The recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission were diverse, pragmatic, and aimed at fostering a more cooperative and balanced federal system. They reflected a philosophy that believed in a strong Centre not at the expense of weak states, but rather in a symbiotic relationship where both levels of government could function effectively for national progress and unity.

1. Legislative Relations

The commission made several crucial recommendations regarding the legislative powers shared between the Union and the States, aiming for greater consultation and clarity.

  • Residuary Powers (Article 248): The commission recommended that while the residuary powers should continue to rest with the Parliament, as per the Constitution, there should be greater consultation with the states before the Centre legislated on subjects falling under the Concurrent List. It did not advocate for transferring residuary powers to the states, recognizing the need for a strong central authority in a diverse country like India.
  • Concurrent List: It emphasized that the Union should consult the States before making laws on subjects in the Concurrent List, especially if they are of significant importance to the States. This was a move towards genuine cooperative federalism, ensuring that state perspectives are considered in national policy-making.
  • President’s Assent to State Bills: The commission recommended that the President’s decision on a State Bill reserved for his consideration (under Article 200/201) should be communicated within a reasonable time, preferably within four months. This was aimed at preventing undue delays which could hamper state governance. It also suggested that if the President decides to withhold assent, the reasons should be communicated to the State Government.
  • Use of Article 356 (President’s Rule): This was arguably the most significant and widely discussed recommendation. The commission strongly advocated that Article 356, which allows the imposition of President’s Rule in a state, should be used “very sparingly, in extreme cases, as a measure of last resort, when all available alternatives fail to prevent or rectify a breakdown of constitutional provisions machinery in the state.” It laid down specific conditions and procedures for its imposition:
    • A warning should be issued to the defaulting state before invoking Article 356.
    • An explanation sought from the state government.
    • All alternative courses of action to restore the constitutional machinery in the state should be exhausted, such as issuing directions under Article 355 or exploring the possibility of forming an alternative government.
    • The proclamation of President’s Rule should be based on a report of the Role of Governor or other material, and the reasons for its imposition should be communicated to the state.
    • The material on the basis of which Article 356 is invoked should be made public.
    • It also suggested that the power of judicial review should be available to challenge the validity of the proclamation. If the court strikes down the proclamation, the dismissed state government should be restored. These recommendations profoundly influenced subsequent judicial pronouncements, most notably the Supreme Court of India’s verdict in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), which established stringent guidelines for the imposition of President’s Rule.

2. Administrative Relations

The commission sought to strengthen inter-governmental coordination and improve the efficiency of administration.

  • All India Services (AIS): The commission strongly recommended strengthening the All India Services (Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service, and Indian Forest Service) as they promote national unity and maintain high standards of administration in states. It viewed them as a vital link between the Centre and the states and opposed any move to abolish or weaken them. It suggested improvements in their training, conditions of service, and cadre management.
  • Inter-State Council (ISC): This was another cornerstone recommendation. The commission emphasized the need for a permanent, independent Inter-State Council under Article 263 of the Constitution. It recommended that the ISC should be a body to which disputes between states or between the Centre and states could be referred, and which could also deliberate on subjects of common interest to promote coordination of policy and action. It envisioned the ISC as a crucial instrument for fostering cooperative federalism. Following this recommendation, the Inter-State Council was indeed constituted in 1990 by V.P. Singh’s government.
  • Delegation of Powers: The commission advocated for greater delegation of administrative and financial powers to the states, ensuring that the Centre intervenes only when necessary for national unity or significant national policy.
  • Deployment of Union Armed Forces: It recommended that while the Union has the authority to deploy armed forces in a state without the state’s consent, it should ideally consult the state government beforehand, especially when the deployment is for internal disturbances. However, it also acknowledged that in situations requiring urgent action, such consultation might not always be feasible.
  • Centralised Planning: The commission suggested that the Planning Commission should be reorganized and transformed into a body where states have a greater say in the formulation of national plans and policies, moving away from a top-down approach.

3. Financial Relations

The commission delved into the complex area of financial resource distribution, aiming to ensure financial stability and equity for states.

  • Sharing of Taxes: The commission largely found the existing scheme of distribution of income tax and Union excise duties to be broadly satisfactory. However, it recommended that the share of states in the divisible pool of Union taxes should be increased. It also suggested that the net proceeds of corporation tax should be made compulsorily shareable with states, though this recommendation has not been fully implemented.
  • Grants-in-aid: It emphasized the need for greater objectivity and transparency in determining grants-in-aid (under Articles 275 and 282). The commission recommended that discretionary grants (under Article 282) should be kept to a minimum and that statutorily prescribed grants (under Article 275) should be the primary mechanism for Financial relations transfers, based on the recommendations of the Finance Commission. It underscored the crucial role of the Finance Commission in ensuring equitable distribution of resources.
  • Borrowing Powers: The commission acknowledged the need for central control over state borrowings but suggested greater consultation with states regarding the terms and conditions of loans. It did not propose any drastic changes to the existing borrowing arrangements, advocating for fiscal prudence at both levels of government.
  • Review of Financial Provisions: It stressed the need for periodic reviews of the Financial relations, especially those related to the distribution of tax revenues, to ensure they remain relevant and equitable as the economy evolves.

4. Role of Governor

The Role of Governor, often a contentious point in Centre-State relations, received significant attention from the commission. It aimed to ensure that the Governor acts as a neutral constitutional head rather than an agent of the Centre.

  • Appointment: The commission recommended that the Governor should be an eminent person from outside the state and should not be actively involved in local politics. Crucially, it suggested that the Chief Minister of the state concerned should be consulted before appointing a Governor.
  • Security of Tenure: It recommended that the Governor should normally complete his five-year term and should not be removed by the central government merely because of a change in government at the Centre. If a Governor is removed, the reasons for such removal should be communicated to him.
  • Discretionary Powers: The commission stated that the Governor’s discretionary powers should be exercised sparingly and only in cases explicitly provided by the Constitution. When exercising discretion, the Governor should provide reasons for his actions. It specifically addressed the issue of reserving state bills for the President’s consideration (Article 200), advising that this power should be used judiciously and not arbitrarily.
  • Caretaker Government: In situations where no party or coalition has a clear majority after an election or the collapse of a government, the Governor should explore all possibilities of forming a stable government before recommending President’s Rule.

5. Other Important Recommendations

Beyond the core areas, the commission also touched upon several other aspects:

  • Zonal Councils: It recommended strengthening and revitalizing the Zonal Councils to promote regional cooperation and address inter-state issues in a non-political manner.
  • Public Order and Law and Order: While “Public Order” is a state subject, the commission recognized the Centre’s role in assisting states to maintain it, especially in situations involving widespread disturbances.
  • Inter-State Water Disputes: It suggested amendments to the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, to ensure a time-bound resolution of disputes through tribunals and to facilitate the implementation of tribunal awards.
  • Emergency Provisions: While detailed recommendations were made for Article 356, the commission also reviewed other emergency provisions, emphasizing their exceptional nature.

Underlying Philosophy of the Commission

The overarching philosophy of the Sarkaria Commission was “cooperative federalism.” It strongly believed that the unity and integrity of India could only be preserved and strengthened through a balanced and cooperative approach between the Centre and the States, rather than through an adversarial or domineering relationship. The commission did not advocate for a weak Centre or a complete overhaul of the existing constitutional structure. Instead, it proposed fine-tuning the arrangements to make them more responsive to the aspirations of states while maintaining the essential strength of the Union. Its recommendations were rooted in the principle that a strong Centre is crucial for national unity and integrity, especially in a country as diverse as India, but this strength should be exercised with sensitivity and in consultation with the states. It championed decentralization without disintegration, promoting consensus-building and mutual respect in governance.

Impact and Implementation

While not all 247 recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission were implemented, its report profoundly influenced the evolution of Centre-State relations in India. The most significant direct outcome was the establishment of the Inter-State Council in 1990, a body that has since served as a vital forum for inter-governmental discussions and resolution of disputes, albeit with varying degrees of effectiveness over time.

The commission’s recommendations regarding Article 356 gained immense jurisprudential significance. The Supreme Court of India extensively cited and relied upon the Sarkaria Commission’s guidelines in its landmark judgment in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994). This judgment effectively curbed the arbitrary use of President’s Rule, making it subject to judicial review and laying down stringent conditions for its imposition. This marked a crucial shift towards constitutional propriety and away from political expediency in the use of this controversial provision.

Other recommendations, such as those concerning the consultation with Chief Ministers for Governor appointments, have seen partial adoption or have become part of established conventions, though not strictly codified laws. The emphasis on strengthening All India Services and greater financial devolution to states through successive Finance Commissions also reflects the spirit of the Sarkaria report. The report served as a crucial reference point for subsequent commissions like the M.M. Punchhi Commission (2007) on Centre-State Relations and continues to inform academic and policy debates on Indian federalism.

The Sarkaria Commission’s report stands as a monumental contribution to the understanding and structuring of Indian federalism. Born out of a period of growing political complexity and regional assertiveness, the commission provided a much-needed framework for re-evaluating the delicate balance between the Union and the States. Its comprehensive analysis spanned legislative relations, administrative, and Financial relations domains, offering pragmatic recommendations aimed at fostering a more harmonious and cooperative relationship within the federal structure.

The commission’s enduring legacy lies in its unwavering advocacy for cooperative federalism, emphasizing that a strong Centre and strong States are not mutually exclusive but rather interdependent for national progress and unity. Its most impactful contributions include the blueprint for the establishment of the Inter-State Council, a forum designed to facilitate dialogue and consensus-building, and its stringent guidelines for the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356. These recommendations significantly influenced legal interpretations and political practices, particularly through the landmark S.R. Bommai judgment, which curtailed the arbitrary use of central power.

While not every one of its 247 recommendations was fully implemented, the Sarkaria Commission’s report provided a robust conceptual and practical framework that continues to shape discussions on Centre-State relations. It underscored the importance of constitutional propriety, transparency, and consultation in governance. The report remains an indispensable resource for policymakers, legal scholars, and citizens seeking to understand the intricacies of India’s federal system and the continuous endeavor to balance central authority with state autonomy in a diverse and democratic nation.